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Abstract
Understanding network traffic behaviour is crucial for managing and securing computer
networks. One important technique is to mine frequent patterns or association rules from
analysed traffic data. On the one hand, association rule mining usually generates a huge
number of patterns and rules, many of them meaningless or user-unwanted; on the other
hand, association rule mining can miss some necessary knowledge if it does not consider
the hierarchy relationships in the network traffic data. Aiming to address such issues, this
paper proposes a hybrid association rule mining method for characterizing network traffic
behaviour. Rather than frequent patterns, the proposed method generates non-similar closed
frequent patterns from network traffic data, which can significantly reduce the number of
patterns. This method also proposes to derive new attributes from the original data to
discover novel knowledge according to hierarchy relationships in network traffic data and
user interests. Experiments preformed on real network traffic data show that the proposed
method is promising and can be used in real application.
Keywords: Network Traffic Analysis, Data Mining, Association Rule Mining
1 Introduction
As computer networks continue growing in terms of size, speed and applications, there is an
increasing demand to understand the behaviours of network traffic such as heavy hitters, scan,
denial-of-service (DoS) attack or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, for managing
and securing networks. Network service providers are eager to know the characteristics of busy
web, ftp and/or email servers, for optimizing the use of network resources and for improving
the network quality of service (QoS). Network administrators want to reveal the characteristics
Corresponding author: Yuefeng Li, Phone: +61 7 3138 5212, email: y2.li@qut.edu.au.
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of hosts participating in malicious activities in order to take further actions to prevent their net-
works from being attacked. Understanding network traffic behaviour is therefore an important
area of research and investigation.
Among various techniques [15, 8, 32], association rule mining, which can reveal detailed
knowledge about network traffic, is an important technique to describe and understand the be-
haviour of network traffic. Association rule mining extracts frequent patterns or association
rules from analysed network traffic data. Frequent patterns are useful to describe behaviours
such as heavy hitters and heavy changes [10, 7, 20], and resource consumptions [11]. Associa-
tion rules are used to detect anomalies [24, 6] and reveal communication structures [18, 1].
Usually, association rule mining based network traffic analysis has two steps. The first step
is to mine frequent patterns from analysed network traffic data. A network traffic dataset is
composed of a set of packets. The information contained in a packet is represented as a set of
items such as IP address, or Port. A pattern is a set of items and is called a frequent pattern if
its support value is larger than a specified minimum support threshold. Support of a pattern is
the number of packets that contain the pattern. For example, pattern fsource IP A, destination
IP Bg is a frequent pattern if it appears in more than 1000 packets, a minimum threshold. This
pattern may reveal a resource abuse host A because it sent a large number of packets to host B.
The second step of association rule mining is to mine association rules from the discovered
frequent patterns. A frequent pattern can be further split into two parts, condition part A and
decision part B, forming an association rule A! B. An association rule A! B is an interesting
rule if its confidence is larger than a minimum confidence threshold. The confidence of the
rule A! B is the ratio of the supports of A[B and A. The rule reveals the knowledge about
how likely A happened which implies B happened. For example, frequent pattern fsource IP A,
source port 80g can form a rule fsource host A! source port 80g. This rule is an interesting
rule if its confidence is larger than a minimum threshold 90%. It may reveal that host A only
provides web service because the host highly used the well-known web service port (port 80) to
communicate with other hosts.
Although a lot of work has been done by using association rule mining to characterize
network traffic [3, 2, 1, 10, 9, 19], there are still two major disadvantages when using traditional
association rule mining to analyse network traffic. The first is that usually there are a lot of
patterns and rules generated, many of them redundant or meaningless [16, 26, 21]. Manually
identifying the useful rules from the association rule mining results is necessary in real practice.
This greatly depreciates the value of association rule mining for characterizing network traffic
behaviour. Secondly, some necessary knowledge can be missed because previous work usually
does not consider the hierarchy relationships among the network traffic data.
Aiming to produce few high quality association rules to reveal the knowledge in network
traffic, in this paper, we propose a hybrid association rule mining approach. Our contributions
are as follows: (1) Rather than frequent patterns, we propose to generate non-similar closed
frequent patterns. The set of non-similar closed frequent patterns is a subset of frequent patterns.
It does not contain what we call similar patterns. Our experiments show that the number of non-
similar closed frequents is less than 3% of the number of frequent patterns. (2) We propose to
derive new attributes from the original data set according to the hierarchy knowledge in network
traffic data. The derived new attributes can analyse network traffic data at different hierarchy
levels. They can reveal novel knowledge in network traffic. In our experiments, around 40%
novel rules has been discovered based on the derived features we defined.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previously related works. Section 3
presents some preliminary association rule mining concepts. Section 4 describes the concepts
of closed frequent patterns, and non-similar closed frequent patterns. Section 5 presents the
concept of derived attributes. Section 6 introduces the rule templates. Section 7 illustrates
the algorithms of the proposed method. Section 8 discusses the experimental results. This is
followed by the conclusion in Section 9.
2 Related Work
Currently, a lot of research work has been done on mining frequent patterns or association rules
from the endless and massive network traffic data, aiming to describe the characteristics of the
networks or to detect anomalies.
Network traffic has “elephant” and “mice” features. The small portion flows (elephants)
generate larger portion traffic and the remaining large portion flows (mice) generate small
portion traffic [13, 12]. Association rule mining techniques mine frequent patterns from net-
work traffic data, which are elegant to characterize the few large flows (“elephants”). Estan et
al.(2003) proposed Autofocus [11] to automatically infer significant resource consumption pat-
terns in network traffic. Mahmood et al.(2008) proposed a hierarchical clustering method[23]
to discover the frequent patterns in the network traffic and claimed that their method had better
performance than Auto f ocus.
Association rule mining techniques can also reveal hidden knowledge by extracting rules
from the network traffic data. Apiletti et al.(2009) proposed NETMINE [1] to mine a set of
association rules for discovering the characteristics of campus network traffic data. Kandula et
al.(2008) proposed eX pose [18] to extract significant communication rules in network traffic
data. A communication rule X ! Y shows that “flow activity X implies flow activity Y”.
Association rule mining techniques are also used to detect anomalies in network traffic data.
In 2003, LERAD [24] was proposed to learn association rules for finding anomalies. Brauckhoff
et al.(2009) combined association rule mining with histogram techniques to detect anomalies.
Although significant achievements have been made by using association rule mining tech-
niques to analyse network traffic data, researchers seldom consider reducing the number of rules
generated. In NETMINE [1], there are nearly 9000 rules generated from a 41 minute dataset
when minimum support is 0.5% and minimum confidence is 20%. In eX pose [18], there are 31
thousand rules generated in a 3 hour dataset. In our experiments, there are at least 40 thousand
rules generated in a 15 minute network traffic dataset (7 million packets) by using traditional
association rule mining methods when the minimum support is 0.2% and minimum confidence
is 40%. It is impossible for network traffic administrators to deal with such a large number rules
at any one time. This motivates us to design a method to extract high quality rules from network
traffic data.
To control the number of rules, specifying the minimum support and minimum confidence
could be a way. The higher the minimum support and minimum confidence thresholds, the
less the rules are generated. However, not all rules with high support and high confidence are
useful. Some rules might provide obvious or meaningless knowledge [21]. Some research
adopted other interestingness measures to select interesting rules in certain aspects of applica-
tions. In NETMINE [1], Li f t was used to select the rules that had strong correlations between
antecedent and consequent. In eX pose [18], the authors used Jmeasure to measure the average
4
Table 1: An example of network traffic data
packets Src Dest Prot LenP
t1 10.0.0.1:2000 2.0.0.2:80 tcp 0
t2 10.0.0.1:2001 2.0.0.2:80 tcp 100
t3 10.0.0.1:2002 2.0.0.2:80 tcp 200
t4 20.0.0.2:2000 3.0.0.3:21 tcp 300
t5 20.0.0.2:2000 4.0.0.4:22 udp 300
amount of information of the consequent given if the antecedent occurred [4].
Some research focused on pruning the redundant patterns [16] to reduce the number of rules,
without changing the thresholds. Mining maximal frequent patterns was proposed to generate
only the maximal frequent patterns, where an itemset (or a pattern) was maximal frequent if
it had no superset that was frequent. Maximal association mining ignored all small patterns.
However, some small patterns can be very useful. Mining closed frequent patterns was proposed
to prune some smaller useless patterns [31]. An itemset (or a pattern) is closed if none of its
supersets has the same support as the itemset.
Although a lot of effort has been made, as mentioned in section 1, there are still some
limitations when using association rule mining techniques to analyse network traffic. To fill the
gaps, this paper proposes a hybrid association rule mining method, which can extract few high
quality association rules from network traffic data.
3 Preliminaries
This section provides some preliminary concepts about association rule mining [26], which is
the basis of our theoretical development and practical experimentation. A real network traffic
data set as shown in Table 1 will be used to illustrate these concepts.
In Table 1, four typical attributes are selected to represent the features of network packets.
They are Src, Dest, protocol (Prot), and Length of payload (LenP), where the Src attribute and
Dest attribute have the form IPaddress:port.
Formally, the network traffic data in a time period can be described as an information ta-
ble (T;V T ), where T is the set of packets in which each packet is a set of items, and V T =
fa1;a2; : : : ;ang is a set of attributes for all packets in T . We usually assume that there is a
function for every attribute a 2V T such that a : T !Va, where Va is the set of all values of a.
An item in one packet can be represented as a= va, where va 2Va. The function Attri(a=
va) returns the attribute name of the item a= va, which is a.
Table 1 presents an example of a network traffic information table used in this context,
where the Src attribute and Dest attribute have the form IPaddress:port. Prot is an abbreviation
of Protocol, LenP is the short of Length of Payload.
For the example in Table 1, wemay defineV T = fSrc;Dest;Prot;LenPg and T = ft1; t2; : : : ; t5g.
The value set of the attribute Prot is VProt = ftcp;udpg. The first packet in Table 1 can be rep-
resented as:
fSrc=10.0.0.1:2000, Dest=2.0.0.2:80, Prot=tcp, LenP=0g, which means host 10:0:0:1 uses its
port 2000 to send a tcp packet without payload to the port 80 of host 2:0:0:2.
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3.1 Frequent Patterns
Definition 1 Let x be a set of items (also called itemset or pattern), the coverset of x denotes
the set of all packets t 2 T such that x t, i.e.,
coverset(x) = ftjt 2 T;x tg: (1)
Given a pattern x, its support or occurrence frequency is the number of packets that contain
the pattern, i.e., sup(x) = jcoverset(x)j. A pattern x is a frequent pattern if sup(x)  min sup,
where min sup is a minimum support.
3.2 Association Rules
Definition 2 Let x be a frequent pattern, and y x. a rule y! (x  y) is called an association
rule, and its confidence is the percentage of transactions containing y that also contain (x  y),
i.e.,
con f (y! (x  y)) = jcoverset(x)jjcoverset(y)j : (2)
The rule y! (x  y) is called an interesting rule if its confidence  min con f , a minimum
confidence.
Association rule mining usually has two steps. The first step is generating frequent patterns,
and the second step is generating interesting rules from the discovered frequent patterns.
4 Non-similar Closed Frequent Patterns
Usually, a huge number of frequent patterns can be generated. In this section, we introduce the
concept of closed frequent pattern [31] and our proposed concept, non-similar closed frequent
pattern, aiming to prune the redundant patterns to reduce the number of patterns produced.
Definition 3 Given a set of packets Y , its itemset denotes the set of items that appear in all the
packets of Y , that is,
itemset(Y ) = fa= vaja 2V T ;8t 2 Y ) a= va 2 tg: (3)
Definition 4 Given a pattern x, its closure
Closure(x) = itemset(coverset(x)) (4)
Closure(x) is the largest set of items that includes x and has the same support as x.
Definition 5 A pattern x is closed if and only if x=Closure(x).
Assuming min sup = 2, Tab 2 shows the results generated from the examples of Table 1
using the above definitions.
There are only three closed frequent patterns in Table 2, which are
fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80;Prot = tcp;sup= 3g
fProt = tcp;sup= 4g
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300;sup= 3g:
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Table 2: Coverset and closure of the frequent patterns
Frequent Pattern coverset Closure
fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80g ft1; t2; t3g fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg
fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg ft1; t2; t3g fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg
fProt = tcpg ft1; t2; t3; t4g fProt = tcpg
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000g ft4; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300g
fLenP= 300g ft4; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300g
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300g ft4; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300g
Theorem 1 Closure(x) is a closed pattern and xClosure(x).
Proof Let y = Closure(x) = itemset(coverset(x)), according to the definition of itemset (See
Definition 3), we have x y, and coverset(x) = coverset(y).
Thus, y= itemset(coverset(x)) = itemset(coverset(y)) =Closure(y).
Therefore, Closure(x) is a closed pattern. 2
Theorem 2 Given a frequent pattern (itemset) x, there is a corresponding closed frequent pat-
tern y , which x y and sup(x) = sup(y).
Proof Actually, the corresponding closed frequent pattern is y = Closure(x). From Theo-
rem 1., y=Closure(x) is a closed pattern and x y and coveret(x) = coverset(y). y is frequent
because coverset(x) = coverset(y) and
sup(x) = jcoverset(x)j= jcoverset(y)j= sup(y): 2
A closed frequent pattern y actually is a representative of a set of frequent patterns whose
corresponding closed frequent pattern is y. The non-closed frequent patterns are a kind of
redundant patterns and can be pruned.
Taking the first two frequent patterns in Table 2 as an example, pattern fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80g
is a non-closed pattern since its corresponding closed pattern is fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80;Prot =
tcpg. The former is redundant and can be pruned because of the two following reasons: (1) the
latter always occurs together with the former because both have the same support value; (2) the
former contains less information than the latter.
Although generating closed frequent patterns can reduce the number of patterns, it cannot
prune what we call similar closed frequent patterns.
Definition 6 Given two closed frequent patterns, x and y, we call x and y are two similar
patterns if x y and sup(x)  sup(y) min sup, where min sup is minimum support.
The above definition means that if the support of a subset x cannot make much difference,
say min sup, to the support of its superset y, x is deemed similar with y and can be pruned.
We can generate a set of non-similar closed frequent patterns by further pruning the shorter
closed patterns that have longer similar closed frequent patterns.
Recall the above three closed frequent patterns, for example, the pattern fProt = tcpg can
be pruned because fProt = tcpg  fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg and,
sup(fProt = tcpg)  sup(fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg) = 4 3= 1 2.
In the above example data in Table 1, if min sup = 2, among the 6 frequent patterns (see
Table 2), only two non-similar closed frequent patterns are discovered, which are
fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80;Prot = tcp;sup= 3g
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fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300;sup= 2g.
Researchers often generate association rules based on closed frequent patterns. We can
generate association rules based on non-similar closed frequent patterns. Obviously, mining
association rules on non-similar closed frequent patterns reduces the number of rules.
5 Derived Attributes
The attributes of the network traffic information table sometimes cannot perfectly represent the
information contained in the network traffic data. Derived attributes are designed to represent
novel information according to the hierarchy relationships among the attributes of the network
traffic data.
There exists hierarchy relationships among the attributes of the network traffic. Based on the
attribute hierarchies, we can derive new attributes that can analyse traffic data at a high abstract
level. For example, as mentioned above, the Src attribute actually can derive two attributes,
SrcIP and SrcPort. The values of SrcIP and SrcPort are IPAddress part and Port part of value
of Src.
Let V T = fa1;a2; : : : ;ang be a set of attributes, the new derived attributes are defined as two
forms :
Definition 7 an+m = fai ^ : : :^ a jg, where fai; : : : ;a jg  V T and an+m is a new derived at-
tribute. The value of the new derived attribute is van+m = f (vai ; : : : ;va j) , where vai; : : : ;va j are
items in the packet.
Definition 8 ai = fan+m^ : : :^an+kg, where ai 2V T , fan+m; : : : ;an+kg is a set of new derived
attributes. The value of new derived attribute an+m is van+m = fan+m(vai).
For example, a new attributeDestProt =Dest^Prot can be derived according to definition 7.
Let van+m = vDest : vProt , vDestProt = 2:1:1:2 : 80 : tcp if vDest = 2:1:1:2 : 80 and vProt = tcp.
Two new attributes SrcIP and SrcPort can be derived from the attribute Src according to
definition 8. Let vSrcIP and vSrcPort be the IP address part and port part of vSrc, respectively,
vSrcIP = 2:1:1:2 and vSrcPort = 80 if vSrc = 2:1:1:2 : 80.
The derived attributes have hierarchy relationships with their original attributes.
Definition 9 Given two attributes a1 and a2, Va1;Va2 are two value sets of these two attributes,
if for every va1 2 Va1 , there exists va2 2 Va2 , and coverset(va1)  coverset(va2), we say a1 and
a2 have hierarchy relationship. a1 is a low level attribute and a2 is a high level attribute. a1 is
called a child attribute of a2.
For example, attributes Src and SrcIP have hierarchy relationship. SrcIP is a high level
attribute while Src is a low level attribute. Src is a child attribute of SrcIP. The attribute
hierarchy relationships can be defined according to the domain knowledge.
According to the example in Table 1, Table 3 lists a new traffic information table with one
derived attribute, SrcIP. We can generate association rules based on the new information table.
Assuming min sup= 2, the Table 4 lists the novel frequent patterns discovered in Table 3.
There are two new non-similar closed frequent patterns discovered from Table 3, which are
fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:1:1:2 : 80;Prot = tcp;sup= 3g
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Table 3: A traffic data table with derived attributes
packets SrcIP Src Dest Prot LenP
t1 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.1:2000 2.0.0.1:80 tcp 0
t2 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.1:2001 2.0.0.1:80 tcp 100
t3 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.1:2002 2.0.0.1:80 tcp 200
t4 20.0.0.2 20.0.0.2:2000 3.0.0.3:21 tcp 300
t5 20.0.0.2 20.0.0.2:2000 4.0.0.4:22 udp 300
Table 4: Novel frequent patterns
Novel Frequent Pattern coverset Closure
fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80g ft1 ; t2 ; t3g fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:1:1:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg
fDest = 2:0:0:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg ft1 ; t2 ; t3g fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:1:1:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg
fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1g ft1 ; t2 ; t3g fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:1:1:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg
fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:0:0:1 : 80g ft1 ; t2 ; t3g fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:1:1:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg
fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Prot = tcpg ft1 ; t2 ; t3g fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:1:1:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg
fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:1:1:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg ft1 ; t2 ; t3g fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:1:1:2 : 80;Prot = tcpg
fProt = tcpg ft1 ; t2 ; t3 ; t4g fProt = tcpg
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000g ft4 ; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300g
fLenP= 300g ft4 ; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300g
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300g ft4 ; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300g
fSrcIP= 20:0:0:2g ft4 ; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300g
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2g ft4 ; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300g
fSrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300g ft4 ; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300g
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300g ft4 ; t5g fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300g
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP= 20:0:0:2;LenP= 300;sup= 2g.
Compared with the original non-similar closed frequent patterns(at the end of Section 4.),
the first pattern contains novel informationfSrcIP = 10:0:0:1g, which cannot be discovered
before introducing the derived attributes.
However, the second pattern contains one redundant item that can be pruned before gener-
ating association rules. Compared with item Src = 20:0:0:2 : 2000, item SrcIP = 20:0:0:2 is a
redundant item because the latter contains less information than the former one. Note that the
attributes of these two items have hierarchy relationship.
Definition 10 Given a pattern fa1 = va1;a2 = va2; : : : ;an = vang, if there exists two items whose
attributes have the hierarchy relationship, we call the high level attribute responding item is a
redundant item that can be pruned to simplify the pattern.
For example, the pattern fSrc = 20:0:0:2 : 2000;SrcIP = 20:0:0:2;LenP = 300g can be
simplified to fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300g because the attribute of item Src= 20:0:0:2 :
2000 is Src, which has hierarchy relationship with the attribute of the item SrcIP = 20:0:0:2,
SrcIP, and SrcIP is a high level attribute while Src is a low level attribute.
After simplifying, the patterns we obtained from the original data set are as follows:
fSrcIP= 10:0:0:1;Dest = 2:1:1:2 : 80;Prot = tcp;sup= 3g
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300;sup= 2g.
6 Rule Templates
In this section, we introduce the concept of rule templates. Rule templates are designed to select
meaningful and user-interested association rules according to the domain knowledge and user
interests.
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In the above two non-similar frequent pattens, pattern fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300;sup=
2g can generate two association rules, with 100% confidence.
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000g) fLenP= 300g;
fLenP= 300g) fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000g.
Among the two rules, the last rule is meaningless according to network domain knowledge
because any host can send a packet with fLenP = 300g . The rule is meaningless if only item
fLenP= 300g occurs in the conditional part. Rule templates can filter the meaningless rules.
Definition 11 A rule template has the expression, fai; : : : ;a jg! fam; : : : ;ang,
where ai; : : : ;a j;am; : : : ;an is a set of attributes, and fai[ : : :[a jg\fam[ : : :[ang= /0.
A rule matches the rule template if its attributes in condition part and decision part are a
subset of the rule template’s condition attributes set and decision attributes set, respectively.
For example, we can define a rule template fSrc;SrcIPg! fDest;DestIP;Prot;LenPg.
The rule fSrc = 20:0:0:2 : 2000g ) fLenP = 300g matches the rule template because the
attribute of the condition part of the rule is fSrcg, which is a subset of fSrc;SrcIPg, the rule
template’s condition attributes list; and the attributes of the decision part of the rule are fLenPg,
which is a subset of fDest;DestIP;Prot;LenPg, the rule template’s decision attributes list.
However, the rule fLenP= 300g)fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000g doesn’t match the rule template
because fLenPg is not a sub set of fSrc;SrcIPg, the rule template’s condition attributes list. The
rule can be pruned.
Hence, if only one rule template fSrc;SrcIPg! fDest;DestIP;Prot;LenPg is defined, only
one rule is generated from pattern fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000;LenP= 300;sup= 2g:
fSrc= 20:0:0:2 : 2000g) fLenP= 300g;con f = 100%
This rule reveals that host 20:0:0:2 always sent packets with fixed payload length 300, this
could be a typical attack symbol.
7 Algorithms
In this section, we introduce the algorithms for mining association rules from network traffic
data according to the theory described in the above several sections. Algorithm 7 outlines the
major steps of our proposed methodology. The input is a set of network traffic Data D and the
output is a set of association rules Rs.
Algorithm 1: Association Rule Mining For Characterizing Network Traffic Behaviour
Input: A Set of Network traffic D;
Output: A Set of Association Rules Rs;
1 Define the new derived attributes NewAttributes and the Attribute Hierarchy Tree AHT ;
2 Define the Rule Templates RTs;
3 Set the Minimum support min sup and the Minimum confidence min con f ;
4 FPs= FP Growth(D;min sup;NewAttributes);
5 NSCFPs= Non Similar(FPs;min sup);
6 SNSCFPs= Simpli f y(NSCFPs;AHT );
7 Rs= ARM(SNSCFPs;min con f ;RTs);
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The first step of this algorithm is defining the derived attributes, NewAttributes, according
to the domain knowledge and user interestingness. NewAttributes is an attributes list and each
attribute has a function to calculate its value. An attribute hierarchy tree AHT is designed to
represent the hierarchy relationships between the original attributes and the derived attributes.
The second step is defining the rule templates. We use a rule templates list to represent all
essential rule templates. For each rule template, we design two lists: the condition attributes
list and the decision attributes list. A rule is interesting and is selected if it’s condition and
decision attributes are a subset of the rule template’s condition attributes and decision attributes,
respectively.
Then, the algorithm executes four functions, FP Growth, Non Similar, Simpli f y, RuleGen
and finally outputs a set of association rules. The four functions are presented as follows.
Function FP Growth Function FP Growth(D;min sup;NewAttributes) is executed in the
fourth step. Frequent Pattern Growth(FP Growth) is a well-known frequent pattern mining
algorithm. Readers can find detailed information of FP Growth in [17]. We directly use it to
generate frequent patterns. While our FP Growth algorithm generates the new derived items for
each network traffic packet according to the derived attributes list NewAttributes when reading
the data. The output of the function is a set of frequent patterns FPs.
Function Non Similar Function Non Similar(FPs;min sup) is executed in the fifth step
to generate a set of non-similar closed patterns NSCFPs from the frequent pattern set FPs.
Algorithm 2 shows the details of the function. The non-similar closed pattern set NSCFPs is
initialized as set FPs. Then the algorithm evaluates every pattern f p i in set NSCFPs, and
removes pattern f p i from NSCFPs if:
(1)there exists a frequent pattern f p j in set NSCFPs and f p i is a proper subset of f p j
and,
(2)sup( f p i)  sup( f p j) is equal to or less than min sup.
Algorithm 2: Non Similar(FPs;minsup) mining Non-Similar Closed Patterns
Input: A Set of Frequent Patterns FPs, min sup;
Output: A Set of Non similar Closed Frequent Patterns NSCFPs;
1 NSCFPs= FPs;
2 foreach Pattern f p i 2 NSCFPs do
3 foreach Pattern f p j 2 NSCFPs do
4 if f p i f p j and sup( f p i)  sup( f p j) min sup then
5 NSCFPs= NSCFPs  f p i;
6 end
7 end
8 end
9 return NSCFPs;
Function Simplify Function Simpli f y(NSCFPs;AHT ) is then executed in the sixth step to
prune the redundant items existing in each pattern in the NSCFPs set. Algorithm 3 illustrates
the process of the function.
The simplified non-similar closed frequent pattern set SNSCFPs is initialized as /0. The
algorithm checks every pattern f p in the NSCFPs set. For each item i in pattern f p, item i is
removed from pattern f p if there exists an item j whose attribute is a child attribute of the item
i. The loop continues till all items in every pattern in the set NSCFPs are checked. The function
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Attri(i) is to get the attribute name of the item i and the function IsChild(Attri(i);Attri( j);AHT )
is to check if Attri(i) is a child attribute of Attri( j) according to the Attribute Hierarchy Tree
AHT . Simplified pattern f p is added to the set SNSCFPs.
Finally, this function outputs a set of simplified non-similar closed frequent patterns SNSCFPs.
Algorithm 3: Simpli f y(NSCFPs;AHT ) simplify Patterns
Input: A Set of Non similar Closed Frequent Patterns NSCFPs, Attribute Hierarchy
Tree AHT ;
Output: A Set of Simplified Non similar Closed Frequent Patterns SNSCFPs;
1 SNSCFPs= /0;
2 foreach Pattern f p in NSCFPs do
3 foreach Item i in f p do
4 foreach Item j in f p do
5 if i 6= j and IsChild(Attri(i);Attri( j)) then
6 f p= f p  i;
7 end
8 end
9 end
10 SNSCFPs= SNSCFPs
Sf f pg
11 end
12 return SNSCFPs;
Function RuleGen Function RuleGen(SNSCFPs;min con f ;RTs) is executed in the last
step to generate a set of association rules Rs from the set SNSCFPs, and filters the uninter-
ested rules according to the rule templates list RTs. Algorithm 4 presents the steps of function
RuleGen. The rule generation algorithm ApRuleGen [27, p. 351] is adopted to generate all of
the rules. We do not present the detail of the algorithm. The functionMatchRuleTemplate(r;RTs)
checks whether rule r matches the rule template RTs. Rules that do not match the rule templates
are removed from set Rs.
Algorithm 4: RuleGen(SNSCFPs;min con f ;RTs) Rule Generation
Input: A Set of Simplified Non-similar Closed Frequent Patterns SNSCFP, min con f ,
rule templates RTs;
Output: A Set of Association Rules Rs;
1 Rs= ApRuleGen(SNSCFPs;min con f );
2 foreach Rule r 2 Rs do
3 if !MatchRuleTemplate(r;RTs) then
4 Rs= Rs  r;
5 end
6 end
7 return Rs;
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8 Experimental Valuation
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method, a set of experiments have been performed
on several real network traffic data sets. The experiments have several purposes: (1) evaluating
the effect of derived attributes to the number of frequent patterns; (2) evaluating the effect of
the non-similar closed frequent patterns; (3) evaluating the effect of rule templates to select
interesting rules; (4) evaluating the effect of derived attributes for generating interesting rules;
(5) efficiency of the proposed methodology. Finally, a result comparison is conducted to show
the effectiveness of the rules discovered by the proposed method.
All the algorithms are implemented in C# on Microsoft visual studio 2010, and all experi-
ments are performed on a Dell OPTIPLEX 980 Serial desktop which has a 2.79GHZ Intel Core
i7 CPU and 4GB main memory, running Windows Server 2008R2.
8.1 Dataset
The experimental datasets are MAWI data traces, which are provided by the WIDE Project [5].
The WIDE network is a large test-bed carrying real user traffic. For privacy reason, only pro-
tocol headers of these real data were kept, and the real IP addresses in the dataset were scram-
bled by a modified version of “TCPdpriv” [28]. The network traffic data was captured by
TCPDUMP [29] and was stored in every 15 minutes. The data traces can be accessed from
http://mawi.wide.ad.jp/mawi/. MAWI work group also provides an anomaly detection result
everyday, which is discovered from the 15 minute data file ‘14000 on the day. The anomaly
detection benchmark is produced by four anomaly detectors: Hough, Gamma, KL, PCA etc.,
reader can find more information in [14].
There are several benefits to select the data traces as experimental datasets. The first benefit
is that the data can be freely used by any research purpose. We can directly download it and
use it from the website. The second benefit is that many research works are performed on the
datasets, it is easy to compare our work with the related works. As we know, TCPDUMP stores
network traffic in packets, comparing with directly using flow datasets [25], additional workload
is necessary to aggregate the packet data traces to flow datasets for analysing. However, another
benefit of using the packet data traces is that packet data traces contain more information than
flow datasets, such as the length of payload used in this research. Therefore, this research
directly uses the packet data traces provided byWIDE.
We selected four datasets dated on 03=03=2006. One is the anomaly detection benchmark
data file 200603031400 and the others are three largest 15-minute data files on 03=03=2006.
The source data we used can be downloaded from http://mawi.wide.ad.jp/mawi/samplepoint-
B/20060303/. The anomaly detection benchmark result can be downloaded from http://www.fukuda-
lab.org/ mawilab/v1.0/2006/03/03/20060303.html.
In the experiments, we further processed each file byWINDUMP [30] and selected four at-
tributes to represent the information contained in a packet, which are Src, Dest, Prot (Protocol),
LenP (Length of Payload).
The characteristics of the datasets are listed in Table 5. The data we used in the experiments
is the same as those in Table 1 (Section 3).
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Table 5: Characteristics of the selected datasets
ID DataFileName Packets Number SrcIP Number DestIP Number
A (Benchmark) 200603031400 8193874 74,000 215,906
B 200603032000 12938715 76,734 314,563
C 200603032015 10874733 79,287 335,954
D 200603032215 10444069 81,395 256,295
8.2 Derived attributes and attribute hierarchy tree
We first derived the new attributes and constructed the attribute hierarchy tree. The derived
attributes and value examples are listed in Table 6. The first four rows are the original attributes
and the rest are new derived attributes, which are marked by “*”. The attributes SrcIP and
SrcPort are derived from attribute Src. The attribute SrcIPH is derived from attribute SrcIP,
which is the first 16 prefix of the SrcIP. The attribute Dest derives three attributes DestIP,
DestPort, DestIPH, which have similar meaning as that from Src.
The derived attributes have hierarchy relationships with their original attributes. An attribute
hierarchy tree can be designed to represent the hierarchy relationships. Figure 1 shows the
attribute hierarchy tree we designed for the experiments.
Table 6: Traffic data attribute list
Attributes Value Examples
Src original 10.0.0.1:2000
Dest original 2.0.0.1:80
Protocol original tcp
LenP original 0
SrcIPH* First 16 Perfix of SrcIP 10.0
SrcIP* IP part of Src 10.0.0.1
SrcPort* Port part of Src 2000
DestIPH* First 16 Perfex of DestIP 2.0
DestIP* IP part of Dest 2.0.0.1
DestPort* Port part of Dest 80
Figure 1: Attribute hierarchy tree
8.3 Experimental results and discussion
Effect of the derived attributes (patterns)
Figure 2a and 2b illustrate the number of frequent patterns (FPs) discovered based on the
datasets with only the original attributes and that with original and derived attributes, respec-
tively. As expected, the number of frequent patterns decreases when the minimum support
min sup is increased. However, the number of frequent patterns discovered from the datasets
with original and derived attributes dramatically increases. When min sup is set to 5000, there
are around 2000 frequent patterns discovered from the datasets with only original attributes
(See Figure. 2a), but nearly 50000 frequent patterns are discovered from that with original and
derived attributes (See Figure. 2b). It is really necessary to take further steps to control the
number of patterns.
Effect of non-similar closed frequent patterns (NSCFPs)
The effect of non-similar closed frequent patterns (NSCFPs) is illustrated in Figures 3a
and 3b. Figure 3a shows the numbers of NSCFPs discovered from the datasets with original
and derived attributes at different min sup values. Figure 3b shows the coverage percentages
of the discovered NSCFPs at different min sup. The coverage percentage of the discovered
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Number of frequent patterns extracted from a). datasets with original attributes and b). datasets with original and derived
attributes, when min sup varies from 1000 to 10000.
patterns is to show the effectiveness of NSCFPs. A pattern covers a package if the pattern is
a subset of the package (itemset). The coverage value of a set of non-similar closed frequent
patterns is the number of packages in which each packet is covered by at least one pattern in the
non-similar closed frequent patterns set. The coverage percentage is the ratio of the coverage
value and the total package number.
As mentioned in section 2, network traffic has ’elephants’ and ’mice’ features. This can be
verified again in the experiments. When min sup is set to 5000, there are around 1100 patterns
selected in each of the four datasets (Figure 3a), but at least 80% of the packets are covered by
these patterns (Figure 3b).
The “elephant” characteristic helps to determine the min sup. As for the network traffic
datasets used in this work, min sup can be set to 5000 since it can cover at least 80% of the
packets.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Number (a) and Coverage (b) of non-similar frequent patterns (NSCFPs) extracted from datasets with original and derived
attributes when min sup varies from 1000 to 10000.
Table 7 lists the numbers of patterns discovered from the datasets when min sup = 5000.
Columns FPs, CFPs, NSCFPs represent frequent patterns, closed frequent patterns and non-
similar closed frequent patterns, respectively. From the table we can see, the numbers of the
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Table 7: The number of patterns
(min sup=5000)
Dataset FPs CFPs NSCFPs NSCFPs/CFPs NSCFPs/FPs
A 42416 4208 1161 27.59% 2.74%
B 38946 4072 1102 27.06% 2.83%
C 46300 4336 1473 24.19% 2.27%
D 41908 4276 1430 25.56% 2.61%
NSCFPs are less than 28% of that of CFPs and are less than 3% of that of the FPs for each
of these four datasets. Obviously, mining non-similar closed frequent patterns successfully
reduces the number of patterns.
Effect of rule templates
From table 6, there are 4 original attributes and 6 derived attributes designed for the exper-
iments. These 10 attributes could generate 310 210+1+1= 57002 kinds of rules [27, p.331].
Hence, it is very necessary to design proper rule templates to control the number of rules since
not all kinds of rules are meaningful or are worth investigating. The rule templates we designed
for the experiments are:
RT1= fSrcIP;Srcg! fSrcPort;Prot;LenP;DestIPH;DestIP;DestPort;Destg
RT2= fDestIP;Destg! fSrcIPH;SrcIP;SrcPort;Src;Prot;LenP;DestPortg
The main purpose of the two rule templates is to reveal the behaviour of significant sources
or destinations. The two rule templates can describe some typical behaviour of network traffic.
Table 8 lists some typical behaviour and their corresponding possible rule types.
Table 8: Traffic behavour and corresponding possible rule types
Behaviour Characteristic Possible rule type
Server Using well-know port SrcIP!fSrcPort;Protg
P2P Huge volume from same source port DestIP!fSrcPort;Protg
DoS large number of packets from SrcIP to DestIP SrcIP!fDestIP;DestPort;Protg
DDoS Huge volume to a server’s well known port DestIP!fDestPort;Prot;LenPg
Port Scanning large number of same size packets to destination IP SrcIP!fDestIP;Prot;LenPg
Resource Abuse heavy volume from source to destination Src!fDest;Protg
Figure 4 illustrates the numbers of rules extracted from the discovered non-similar closed
frequent patterns at different min con f values when min sup = 5000. From the figure we can
see, more than 5000 rules whose confidence are larger than 90%. When min con f = 0:4, there
are more than 7000 rules are generated for each of the four datasets. Although the rules are
generated based on the non-similar closed frequent pattens, the numbers of rules are still very
large.
Table 9 shows the number of rules selected by the rule templates RT1 and RT2 when
min sup= 5000 and min con f = 0:4. The “Total” column represents the number of total rules
before using rule templates. The column RT1, RT2 and RT1+RT2 represents the number of
rules that matches the rule template RT1, RT2 and RT1 or RT2, respectively. The rule templates
have significant effectiveness to select the interesting rules. Only less than 300 rules match the
RT1 and around 200 rules match the RT2. The rules that match the RT1 or RT2 are less than
7% of the “Total” rules. Rule templates play an important role in filtering the interesting rules.
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Figure 4: Number of rules with different min con f
Table 9: Number of rules with RTs
(min sup= 5000,min con f = 0:4)
Data Total RT1 RT2 RT1+RT2 (RT1+RT2)Total
A 7666 289 215 504 6.6%
B 7291 292 199 491 6.7%
C 7889 287 202 489 6.2%
D 7382 241 186 485 6.6%
Effect of derived attributes (rules)
Table 10 shows the number of rules obtained from the data sets with the derived attributes
when min sup= 5000 and min con f = 0:4. The “Total” column represents the number of total
rules after using rule templates. The “Derived” represents the number of rules obtained by
derived attributes. There are more than 40% rules that are obtained by derived attributes in the
four data sets. Derived attributes contribute significantly to generate novel knowledge.
Table 10: Number of rules generated with derived attributes
(min sup= 5000;min con f = 0:4)
DataSets Total (RT1+RT2) Derived Derived/Total
A 504 246 48.8%
B 491 231 47.0%
C 489 233 47.6%
D 485 233 48.0%
Effectiveness of the discovered rules
To further evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method, we compare our results from
dataset A with the anomaly benchmark result provided byWIMA. The anomalies in benchmark
are characterized by five attributes: srcip, destip, srcport, destport, protocol etc. Without con-
sidering the time issue, there are 101 anomalies in the benchmark result. Table 11 shows the
comparison result.
Table 11: Comparison with anomaly detection benchmark
(Dataset A)
Result Total Matched Unmatched Matched/Total
Benchmark 101 63 38 62.4%
Our Result 504 218 286 42.3%
Among the 101 anomalies, there are 63 anomalies matched by 218 rules in our result. For
one anomaly in benchmark, there are several corresponding rules in our result. We select one
matched anomaly discovered in benchmark and our corresponding results, aiming to show the
difference.
The anomaly in benchmark is
srcip=null;srcPort=null;destip=164.2.90.59;destPort=null;Prot=null;
Hough=1;Gamma=1;KL=0;PCA=1;
The first line means the feature of the anomaly is destip = 164:2:90:59, the rest attributes
are null. The second line means the anomaly is detected by three anomaly detectors (Hough,
Gamma and PCA), the anomaly detector KL cannot detect it.
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Table 12: The corresponging rules mathched the anomaly
ID Condition Decision Confidence Support
1 destip=164.2.90.59; srcPort=80;length=1460;prot=tcp; 0.94 48318
2 destip=164.2.90.59;
srcip12=70.192;srcPort=80.;
0.70 35864
length=1460;prot=tcp;
3 destip=164.2.90.59;
src=70.192.131.133:80;
0.50 25549
length=1460;prot=tcp;
The rules generated by our method which match the above anomaly are listed in Table 12.
There are three rules in the table. The condition parts of the rules are same as the feature of the
anomaly, which is destip= 164:2:90:59. The rules reveal rich information about the anomaly.
From the first rule we know, the host 164:2:90:59 received 48318 tcp packets that were sent
from port 80, each packet has a 1460 length payload. The rule reveals that host might be a
resource abuse host since it received a large number of packets from some web services (port
80). The second rule provides further knowledge that the resource abuse network is 70:192
since almost 70% of the packets come from the network. The third rules provides more deep
knowledge that almost 50% packets were sent from the web server 70:192:131:133. Obviously,
our method provides more detailed information about the anomaly. However, it increases the
number of results.
As we know from Table 11, there are 286 rules that cannot match the anomaly benchmark.
However, these rules are also worth investigating. Table 13 lists top 5 unmatched rules ranked
by support to further show the knowledge discovered by our method.
Table 13: Top 5 unmatched rules ranked by support
ID Condition Decision Confidence Support
1 srcip=88.213.226.215;
dest=148.179.135.12:80;
1.00 417025
length=0;prot=tcp;
2 destip=148.179.163.10;
srcip=95.94.90.205;
0.99 154690
length=76;proc=UDP;
3 destip=148.179.45.46; destPort=3888;prot=UDP; 1 70043
4 src=4.154.228.14:80; destip12=140.223;proc=tcp; 1 48715
5 destip=140.223.50.64;
src=6.196.217.210:80;
0.74 48337
length=1448;proc=tcp;
We briefly describe the meanings of the rules.
The first rule discovers a heavy hitter. The host 88:213:226:215 sent 417025 tcp packets
without payload to the host 148:179:135:12’s port 80. It is really abnormal that a host sent such
a huge number packets to a web server in 15 minutes.
The second rule means the host received 154690UDP packets from host 95:94:90:205, each
packet has a fix length payload 76. Sending a huge number of small fixed length packets to one
host is worth investigating.
The third rule and fourth rules reveal some noticeable knowledge. From the third rule we
know that host 148:179:45:46 always uses port 3888 for communication. The fourth rule reveals
that 4:154:228:14 uses port 80 (a web server symbol) severing the network 140:233.
The fifth rule discovers a heavy hitter. The host 140:223:50:64 received 48337 tcp packets
that were sent from host 6:196:217:210’s port 80, each packet has a 1448 length payload.
Efficiency of the proposed methodology
To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed methodology, we compared the running time
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of two kinds of solutions. The first is the running time that generating rules based on the
closed frequent patterns discovered from the original datasets without derived attributes. The
second is the running time of generating rules based on the non-similar closed frequent patterns
discovered from the datasets with derived attributes. Figure 5a and figure 5b illustrate the
running time of two solutions when minimum support varies from 2000 to 7000.
It is seen from the two figures that generating patterns and rules from the datasets based on
only the original attributes spends less time than that based on original and derived attributes.
Whenmin sup= 2000, to generate patterns from the four datasets, the former solution spent less
than 200 seconds (see figure 5a), while the latter spent more than 380 seconds (see figure 5b).
The running time of generating frequent patterns and rules is highly related with the number of
attributes and the value of minimum support. When min sup= 5000, the running time spent by
the former solution decreases to less than 160 seconds (see figure 5a), while the running time
spent by the latter solution decreases to less than 270 seconds (see figure 5b). As we know, each
data trace contains 15-minute network traffic, the proposed method is efficiently enough to be
used in real application for a same scale traffic network.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Running-time of generating rules from (a) closed frequent patterns (CFPs) based on datasets with original attributes (b) non-similar
closed frequent patterns (NSCFPs) based on datasets with original and derived attributes.
9 Conclusion and Future Works
As network traffic data is becoming more and more massive and complex, the major challenge
is to extract high quality knowledge for understanding the behaviour of network traffic. For
this, this paper presented a hybrid association rule mining based method. The method proposed
the concept of non-similar closed pattern to prune redundant patterns and to reduce the number
of patterns and rules. The proposed method also derived new attributes for revealing novel
knowledge in network traffic data according to the hierarchical knowledge and user interests.
Rule templates was also adopted to filter meaningful and user interesting rules. Experiments
that had been performed on real traffic data sets have shown that the method is promising in
reducing the number of rules and characterizing network traffic behaviour.
The research can be extended and improved in several ways in the future work. First of all,
currently, the proposed method focuses on mining frequent patterns and discovering rules from
the frequent patterns, work is necessary to identify infrequent interesting patterns and rules.
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This issue can be relieved in the future work by introducing novel measures (i.e. diversity [22])
to identify the infrequently interesting patterns or rules. Secondly, as for anomaly detection,
further investigations could be done to improve the accuracy and reduce the number of results
by considering the data traces in a time-serial manner to prune the constantly occurred patterns
or rules, which can be considered as normal patterns or rules. Thirdly, rather than the two
steps association rule mining, pattern mining and rule generation, directly generating rules from
analysed datasets could be a way to improve the efficiency of the proposed method.
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